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ABSTRACT
This thesis analyzes social benefit investment strategies of
public pension funds. In particular, the research focuses on
the call for social benefit investment of these funds in the
development of affordable housing. It will make the argument
that there is a quantum leap from the call for social benefit
investment of public employee pension funds (which address and
meet the social needs of the public sector) and the actual
feasibility or facility of investing public pension funds in
non-conventional investment ventures.
The increased participation of pension funds in real estate
demonstrates a growing interest and trend of pension
investment in this field. Within the field of real estate
development, there is a proposition that pension funds should
invest in housing development. It has been suggested that
these funds may play a critical role in housing finance. More
precisely, there are those who advocate the investment of
public pension funds in affordable housing development. This
is commonly recognized as the call for "social benefit
investment" of public pension funds.
The introduction of this paper sets the general framework of
this research, namely introducing its three main components:
public pension funds, social benefit investment advocacy and
affordable housing. Chapter One discusses, in detail, public
pension funds. General characteristics of these pension funds
are described. The various standards and constraints which
social benefit investments must observe are discussed in
Chapter Two. Institutional barriers, (for both pension and
investment industries) are presented.
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Chapter Three explores the disparities that exists between
the interested parties seeking public pension funds in social
benefit investments, (i.e. pension trustees, state and local
governments, financial institution, housing developers and
local communities). As a result, an rhetorical discussion has
developed which presumably matches public pension fund
investment in affordable housing. This marriage, under the
call for social benefit investment, has been obscured by
misinterpreted nomenclature of each party. This factor
combined with institutional barriers has created a gap
between the advocacy for social benefit investment for the
development of affordable housing and the actual undertaking
of public pension funds investment in affordable housing.
Chapter four presents the principal conclusion that social
benefit investment, as defined, directly conflicts with
fiduciary standards, thereby compromising existing funds and
future retirement benefits. In cases where social benefit
investment has taken place, insurance or guarantees have
offset the high risk associated with housing development.
These guarantees have encourage public pension fund investment
in mortgage related instruments. However, they do not
necessary fulfill a social benefit criteria.
The prevailing debate which marks social benefit investment
suggests a divergence between the actual investment of public
pension funds in housing and the advocacy of these funds in
socially beneficial ventures.
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INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 1988, democratic presidential candidate,
Jesse Jackson announced that, as president, he would establish
a "national investment program" that would market new types of
securities to public pension funds in order to "rebuild
America." The program would issue federally backed securities
to finance "economically viable" projects such as low-income
housing, neighborhood revitalization, small business loans,
and infrastructure investment. Jackson proposed that 10
percent of public pension plan assets be so invested. [excerpt
from EBRI Issues Brief, 1988a]
The above proposal suggests that pension funds as investment
capital are an appropriate resource which should be targeted
for specific endeavors. However, the issue of whether or not
pension funds' should be invested in socially useful 2 ways has
been debated since the late 1970's [Rosen, 1976; Drucker,
1976; Rifkin/Barber, 19781.
In the 1980's, the interest in pension funds has intensified
considerably. Total assets of private and state and local
government (public) pension funds continue to grow at an
exponential rate. They now exceed $2 trillion, representing
the single largest pool of investment capital in the nation.
Recognizing the magnitude of total pension assets--both
present and future--many have focused on the potential impact
on how and where these funds are placed.
1 Unless specified, referring to the broad spectrum of
private and public funds.
2 Socially useful will be defined in Chapter 1 and fully
discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis.
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The 1970's marked a period of rapid evolution in domestic
financial markets. The thrift industry witnessed severe
disintermediation crises during the recessions of 1969-70 and
1974-75. Housing investment and production fluctuated wildly
between boom and bust. As inflation steadily mounted
competition between financial institutions increased.
In the 1980's these changes continued. The effects of a
rising inflation rate in the 1970's, with Consumer Price Index
reaching double-digit levels, were equally felt in the early
1980's. Disintermediation of the mortgage market broadened.
In the spring of 1981 major changes were authorized in the
types of mortgage instruments offered by federally chartered
financial institutions. In March 1981, national-banks were
allowed to make an adjustable-rate mortgage loan. Interest
rates could be raised or lowered according to changes in a
specific index, by 1 percent every six months. There was no
limit on the cumulative change in the interest rates of the
life of the loan.
By April 1981, mortgage instruments were completely
deregulated. The adjustable mortgage loan was authorized,
under which no limits were placed on payments or interest rate
adjustments on a periodic or cumulative basis. However,
limits have been put in place since originally authorized.
3 Florida, Richard L., editor, Housing and the New
Financial Markets, Center for Urban Policy Research, Rutgers
University, New Brunswick, NJ., 1986, p. xii.
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In March 1983, new regulations were developed for national
banks, allowing them to use any interest rate index upon which
to base the adjustable-rate mortgage indices. These new
regulations removed all limits on periodic or aggregate
changes to interest rates or monthly payment amounts.
During this period (1970-80), the importance of the
secondary mortgage market developed, although changes were
noted as early as 1970. The seventies marked the importance
of the secondary mortgage market, although the importance
fluctuated cyclically, increasing in bad financial times,
decreasing in good financial times.
In the 1980's, a sizeable jump in secondary mortgage market
importance has occured. Within this market, which includes all
transactions involving already existing mortgage loans, a
shift has occurred toward mortgaged-backed securities. The
montage-backed securities market has experienced more rapid
change in the short time between 1984 and 1986 than it did
during the whole period from 1970 to 1983.*
The emphasis on mortgage investments for the rapidly
expanding investor base led to the creation of the
collateralized mortgage obligation. The securitization of
mortgages simplified mortgage investments and reduced concerns
regarding liquidity and marketability of mortgage assets.
9
* Landau, Richard S., Secondary Mortgage Markets, Montage
Institute Inc., Probus Publishing Co., Chicago, IL., 1987,
p.135.
In the early 1970s, montage-backed securities were
synonymous with the Government National Mortgage Association
(GNMA). Within its first issues, mortgaged-backed securities
accounted for 13% of the secondary market. By 1982, they
accounted for over 74%. In 1987, GNMA accounted for more than
three quarters of the secondary mortgage market. The ability
to sell large numbers of mortgages and mortgage-backed
securities suggest the inherent soundness and competitive
quality of mortgage-backed investments.'
New federal regulations have resulted in a decade in which
depository institutions have competed for liabilities in a
deregulated environment. The institutional foundations of the
financial system--the passbook account and the fixed rate
mortgage--have declined in their importance. Residential
finance has been transformed from a relatively sheltered
system to one of complete deregulation. This financial
deregulation has been and continues to be, the catalyst for
change in the mortgage lending institutions.
The changes in the financial industry over the last twenty
years illustrates the volatility of the financial industry,
changes in capital markets, and consequential changes in
federal regulations which have brought forth a revolution in
the housing finance system.
5 Koch, June Q.(Dr.), introduction for Pension and
Mortgages: Housing Investment Opportunities for the 80's, US
Department of Housing and Urban Development, Washington, D.C.,
1983, p. 5 .
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Prior to deregulation, the nation's capital markets were
separated primarily into two segments--a large segment
concerned mainly with housing and another large segment
concerned with other types of investments (i.e. corporate
bonds, corporate stocks, nonresidential real estate,
investment banking, etc.) Housing finance was separated from
other types of finance mainly because thrifts were regulated
under specific rules. Deregulation removed many of the
institutional and legal barriers that formerly separated these
two segments.6
The increasing size of pension funds, and their increasing
participation within the capital market has inevitably thrusts
the funds (and their managers and investment practices) in to
the public focus, especially in view of predictions that their
share in available US capital will continue to increase
sharply.
The role of pension funds in the capital market is of
critical importance, as are the concerns about the risks
associated with various pension fund investment strategies.
In terms of suppliers of funds, pension funds because of their
growing size, have increased their flow of capital to the
capital market consistently over several decades. In 1950,
6 Downs, Anthony, The Revolution in Real Estate Finance,
The Brooking Institute, Washington, DC, 1985, pp.5 4 -5 .
11
pension assets7 accounted for 3% of all outstanding funds
advanced to credit markets. By 1973, pension funds had
tripled as a source of credit and by the mid-1980s, pension
funds held one of every six dollars of outstanding funds.8
The importance of pension fund capital in the capital market
goes well beyond its immense size. Pension funds are most
notable because of their financial characteristics, especially
the very long term nature of their financial liabilities.
These liabilities (the payment of retirement benefits) in
general, will not mature for decades. This long term horizon
suggests a unique role pension funds may play as a potential
resource of long-term capital for housing.
It has been suggested that pension funds should be used to
address some of the problems cities are now facing. In
particular, investment of public pension funds in affordable
housing has been advocated by various interest groups. To
date, few public pension funds have invested in housing.
While state and local government pension funds total over $521
billion (at year-end 1987), investment in housing has been
estimated at a minimal two or three percent of public pension
assets; public pension funds appear to be an untapped resource
for housing finance.
7 Pension assets are the sum of employer and employee
contribution plus the amount of earnings gained from the
investment of original contributions.
8 Employee Benefit Research Institute, EBRI Issues Brief,
#40, Washington, D.C., 1985.
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The entry of public pension funds, in particular, into the
conventional residential mortgage market is a recent and
growing phenomenon. This entry has been precipitated in part
by public pension funds' growing awareness of this market
sector, and in part, by the inability of traditional mortgage
market participants to maintain long-term investment posture
in a volatile market.
Since 1970, state and local public pension funds have
increased their holding in mortgaged related securities from
11.1 percent of the market to 14.2 percent by the end of 1981'
to 16.3% in 1986. While this increase maybe slight, the base
of pension assets has rapidly grown over time. The trend of
holding mortgage related securities is expected to continue
and accelerate as the pace of pension fund asset growth
exceeds that of other financial intermediaries. This shift in
mortgage securities is further encouraged by their relative
attractiveness as alternative high-yielding investments, with
relatively risk free or low risk offset. The enactment of
local legislation facilitating pension fund investment in
mortgage securities further encourages the move of public
pension funds into mortgage-related securities.
The recent entry of public pension funds into residential
mortgages has tempted many jurisdictions to consider, and in
some cases, implement a policy of "social benefit investing"
9 "Administration pushes mortgages." Pension and Investment
Age, March 15, 1982, p. 42.
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in connection with their real estate investments. While
social benefits cannot be generalized because they correspond
to specific instances under any given condition, social
benefit investment is specifically defined. The investment of
pension assets under social benefit investment policy are a)
intentionally, ventures of direct social benefit with little
regard to investment risk or return or; more commonly, b)
investments which are as competitive or comparable in
investment yield as other pension investments of similar type
with socially beneficial consequences constitute a social
benefit investment strategy. The former definition of social
benefit investment strategy encourages pension mangers or
trustees, to consider factors other than, and often in place
of, traditional tests of prudence, (i.e. investment return,
safety of principal or diversification) in making an
investment decision. The latter emphasizes portfolio
diversification.
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The potential impact of public pension funds in the
development of affordable"* housing is broad. It is argued
that if social benefit investment is promoted and targeted
towards investment in local affordable housing programs, many
low- and moderate-income residents facing housing shortages
will have potential access to an untapped alternative
financing resource. Further, proponents of affordable housing
development argue that public pension funds are suitable for
social benefit investment in housing due to their long-term
commitment, minor demand for liquidity, and minor waver with
intermediate fluctuation of interest rates [Litvak, 1981].
Historically, pension fund investment has consisted of
investment in government bonds, and Treasury bills.
Investment in residential mortgages (i.e. housing) has
consisted of recommending the purchase of secondary mortgage-
backed securities--guaranteed by quasi-public agencies such as
GNMA, Federal National Mortgage Association, FNMA, and Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, FHLMC. The investment of
10 Affordable: The traditional measure of affordable has
been a ratio of current housing expenses to current income. The
accepted norm has been that households should not spend more
than 25 to 30 percent of their incomes on housing. However one
must question whether this definition is being advocated by
social benefit investments in housing or if indeed, housing is
defined as that portion of the housing market made up of three
distinct segments with respective affordability measures based
on the area median income: Moderate-income households would have
80 to 120 percent of an area median income; low-income
households which has 50 to 80 percent of an area median income;
or very low-income households would have 50 percent of an area
median income.
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these funds in residential mortgages has primarily resulted in
investment of capital in a capital market which already has
built in participants (i.e. investors within the secondary
mortgage market, syndicators, etc.), or, the more secure
investment of pension funds into residential properties that
do not necessarily address the need of affordable housing
(market rate housing developments such as condominiums, or
townhouses, etc.). These investments, while geared toward
residential mortgages, do not necessarily meet the call or the
criterion of social benefit investment in affordable housing.
This thesis analyzes social benefit investment strategies of
public pension funds. In particular, the research focuse.s on
the call for social benefit investment of these funds in the
development of affordable housing. It makes the argument that
there is a quantum leap from the call for social benefit
investment of public employee pension funds (which address and
meet the social needs of the public sector) and the actual
feasibility or facility of investing public pension funds in
non-conventional investment ventures, such as affordable
housing.
To achieve socially beneficial investment of public pension
funds in the development of affordable housing, they must be
targeted towards meeting specific capital needs of cities and
their low- and moderate-income residents. For a social
benefit investment strategy to evolve, consolidated efforts
between pension fund managers, federal and state governments,
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traditional financial institutions, and local communities must
take place in order to develop an investment strategy which
will best meet the goals of "social benefit" investment.
Chapter One discusses in detail public pension funds.
General characteristics of these pension funds are given.
Chapter Two defines and discusses social benefit investment,
its criteria, current practice and critiques. In addition,
the chapter focuses on the institutional standards and
constraints social benefit investments must adhere to.
Chapter Three presents the disparities that exists between
the interested parties seeking public pension funds in social
benefit investments, (i.e. pension trustees, state and local
governments, financial institution, housing developers and
local communities). As a result, an illusive rhetorical
discussion has developed which presumably matches public
pension fund investment in affordable housing. This marriage,
under the call for social benefit investment, has been
obstructed by institutional, ideological and practical hurdles
which exist within the industries that are linked under this
banner. As a result, a gap exists between the actual
undertaking of public pension funds investment in affordable
housing and the advocacy for social benefit investment for the
development of affordable housing.
Chapter Four presents the atmosphere under which social
benefit investment in affordable housing may take place.
While certain aspects of this atmosphere currently exist, the
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practice of social benefit investment fails to gain usage due
to several factors. These factors are identified and
presented in a model case scenario.
The principal conclusion of this paper is that the gap
between the actual facility of using public pension fund
investment in socially beneficial ventures and the advocacy
for social benefit investment in affordable housing has
constrained the development of such undertakings. This raises
the question, is social benefit investment viable as currently
propositioned? What are the implications for those who
advocate these funds given the existing atmosphere and
constraints of these funds?
18
CHAPTER ONE
PUBLIC PENSION FUNDS
HISTORY:
The rapid growth of private and public pension plans
has made them into one of the largest and most dynamic sources
of capital. Although the huge growth in pension capital is a
relatively new phenomena, pension plans are more than a
hundred years old. New York City established the nation's
fist public pension plan in 1850 (New York City Teachers
Fund); in 1875, the American Express Company established the
first private pension plan, and the Metropolitan Life
Insurance Company sold the first group plan in 1921. Over the
next fifty years pension programs were established by many
large employers including banks, utilities, mining and
petroleum companies and manufacturers. In 1929, there 397
private plans in operation. By the early 1980's, there were
more than 640,000.
Pension plans were initially used by employers as an
incentive for maintaining a stable workforce, given as a
gratuity to compensate loyalty to the firm." Today, pension
plans serve as retirement income or benefits paid to employees
and/or their beneficiaries upon retirement. Pressure from
private sector unionized labor to gain employer accountability
19
11 Landecker, Anita E., "Strategic Investment of Pension
Funds," M.I.T. Master's Thesis, Department of Urban Studies,
1982, pages 12-13.
in providing retirement benefits, established the precedent
for public acceptance of pension plans. 2 By the mid-1980's,
pensions had become a standard feature for most public and
private employers: over two-thirds of all private sector full-
time employees and more than 92% of full-time public employees
were covered by pension plans."
When discussing pension funds, two distinct categories are
covered: private sector and public sector funds. These funds
are in themselves subdivided by specific pension programs:
* defined benefit employer pensions--Program that assures
benefit upon retirement with the contribution fluctuating and
the employer bearing the risk of poor investment returns;
*defined contribution employer pensions--Program that pledges
a given contribution with the ultimate benefit fluctuating and
the employee bearing the risk of poor investment; and,
*individual pensions--Program generally offering defined
contribution in approach with the employee making some of the
contribution and bearing all of the risk of poor investment
returns.
Within the private sector, funds are divided into single-
employer funds and multi-employer funds. Public sector funds,
on the other hand, are composed of state and local government
pension funds (which included teachers, police, fire, public
university funds). While public pension funds usually refer
to state and local plans, they are distinct from plans which
cover all federal employees, including the military and
members of Congress. Other differences between public and
12 ibid, p. 14.
13 op cit, EBRI Issue Brief #40, 1985.
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private pensions include distinct funding mechanisms,
investment practices and laws governing them. These factors
add to the complexity of the scope in which pension funds
operate.
An important distinction between pension funds and other
investment sources further illustrates the distinctive
characteristics of these funds. While banks or insurance
companies solicit investment capital, pension funds do not
compete for investment dollars. They are recipients of paid
contributions and interest/investment income. Furthermore,
pension funds are not innovators in that they are not players
outside of the traditional investment market, although they
are increasingly beginning to move into new investment areas
that others investors have proven profitable. Unlike profit-
maximizing investors in the capital markets who seek optimal
returns from innovative investment, the fundamental purpose of
pension funds is the payment of retirement benefits. Hence,
their tendency towards conservative investment behavior.
Between the time they receive contributions and pay out
benefits, pension managers seek investments that will preserve
the existing capital, while hopefully, producing an attractive
investment return.
In light of the above, it is critical to understand the
clear distinctions between the role of pension funds to other
investors, and more importantly, the categoric distinctions
within the broader label of "pension fund" (i.e. public versus
21
private). Pension funds cannot be viewed monolithically.
There is an enormous variation among private and public plans
and in the ways different kinds of pension funds are invested.
The most integral aspect of pension fund investments is their
historically conservative approach to investment. Pension
funds will almost never knowingly accept reduced rates of
return in order to support social needs. This pattern has not
changed over the last twenty years nor is it likely to change
in the near future because of their designation as a safety
net as retirement income. However, pension funds can be
expected to move towards more innovative investment ventures
once they are proven profitable by private investors, and seek
out new ways to assist plan participants without jeopardizing
the ultimate payment of benefits.
The above discussion serves as a foundation for illustrating
the characteristics of pension plans within the broad spectrum
of pension funds. The focus of subsequent discussion will now
specify public (state and local government) pension funds.
Any mention of pension funds, hereafter, refers to this
particular sector.
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Public Pension Funds
As the entire state and local government sector has grown,
so too has their pension assets. At year-end 1987, projected
estimates, based on American Council of Life Insurance and
data from the Federal Reserve Board, put state and local
government pension assets at $521 billion.
The 1978 Pension Task Force Report on Public Employee
Retirement Systems identified 6,630 separate retirement
systems covering employees of state and units of local
government. These systems had approximately 10.4 million
active members and an additional 2.4 million inactive members
(retirees, disability or survivor beneficiaries, and persons
qualified for benefits at a later date.)1 4 Although fewer in
number than those in the private industry, public pension
funds are generally larger, many totalling several billions of
dollars for thousands of public employees.
State and local pension funds are financed by contributions
from the employer (government) and the employees. However,
financing does vary. State and local employees covered by
social security for example, pay about 6-7%, while those
employees not covered contribute 8-10%.'5 The government (i.e.
* Ross, William B., "The Structure of Public Employee
Pension Funds", article in Pension Funds and Residential
Mortgages, Mortgage Bankers Association of America, Washington,
DC, 1984, p. 1 3 .
1 Munnell, Alicia H., Pensions for Public Employees,
National Planning Association Report #171, July 1979,
Washington, DC, p.9.
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employer) contributes to what amounts to 150% of what the
worker pays into the fund (US House Pension Task Force, 1978).
In addition, investment earnings influence the amount of
employer contribution. The greater the investment earnings,
the less the employer must contribute.1 6 Contributions to the
fund are tax-exempt.
The majority of these funds are handled through a defined
benefit plan as opposed to a defined-contribution plan. A
defined benefit plan indicates that an employer guaranteed
compensation (a specified amount of money) is paid to the
employee upon retirement. It is a fixed benefit based on a
formula which takes into account years of service and average
annual salary. Investment risk of pension funds under this
plan is born by the employer since, regardless of investment
performance, the employer is obligated to pay out a specified
amount to retirees. Yet, the benefit is a function of
whatever this money can earn while invested. A defined-
contribution plan is based on a base amount regardless of
length of employment, hourly wage, etc. In general, most
state and local plans are a combination of defined-benefit and
defined-contribution plans.
16 Litvak, Lawrence, Pension Funds & Economic Renewal,
Council of State Planning Agencies, Washington D.C., 1981, p. 4 9 .
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Standards for Public Pension Funds
Unlike the private sector, where management decides and
negotiates policy and practices in accordance with the 1974
Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), state and
local government pension funds have no one standard. Rather,
the management and control of public pension funds are
determined by state and local statutes. Specific guidelines
range from "prudent man" restrictions to legislative
regulations (state and local statutes) to "interest of the
participant" rule. In addition, the Internal Revenue Service
requires certain eligibility rules which qualify pension fund
contribution as tax exempt.
As fiduciaries--one to whom property is entrusted to manage
for others--the trustees and managers of public pension funds
must observe certain duties in investing retirement funds.
Two essentials of fiduciary law are the duty of loyalty and
the duty of reasonable care.
The duty of loyalty is designed to prevent conflicts of
interest between the fiduciary and the beneficiaries. A
fiduciary cannot choose self or someone else's interests over
those of the beneficiary. This duty is required by common law
and the requirements of the Internal Revenue Service for
public retirement system tax exemption.1 7
1 op cit, Litvak, 1981, p. 55.
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The duty of reasonable care is designed to insure that
investment decisions will be informed, rational and
appropriate to the needs of the pension fund. This forms the
fundamental of the "prudent man" principle whereby reasonable
care translates into "the use of methods and techniques which
take into account principles, theories, customs and
conventions generally observed by the investment community"
[Bines, 1978].
The federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA) enacted fiduciary standards for the investment of
private pension plans, further defining the scope of the
"prudent man" rule. Fiduciary as defined in ERISA states:
A person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to extent
i)he/she exercises any discretionary authority or
discretionary control respecting management or disposition of
its asset, ii)he/she renders investment advice for a fee or
other compensation direct or indirect with respect to any
moneys or other property of such plan or has any authority or
responsibility in the administration of such plan.'"
This defined fiduciary must adhere to specific
responsibilities as set forth in Section 404 of ERISA:
A fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a
plan solely in the interest of the participated
beneficiaries and a) for the exclusive purpose of providing
benefits to participants and their beneficiaries and
defraying participants reasonable expenses of administering
the plan. b)with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence
under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man
acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters
would use in conduct of an enterprise of a like character
and with like aim c) by diversifying the investment of the
plan so as to minimize the risk of large losses, unless
under circumstances it is clearly prudent not to do so; and
18 Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA),
Section 3 (21), 29 U.S.C., 1002 (21), 1974.
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d) in accordance with the documents and instruments
governing the plan in so far as such documents and
instruments are consistent with the provisions of this
title. 19
Although ERISA does not directly regulate public pension
plans nor their investments, ERISA does influence public
pension investment policies or strategies. It is not uncommon
for public pension funds to adhere to the prudent man
guidelines nor for legal counsel to advise public trustees to
follow the ERISA guidelines. The prudent man standard is in
part measured by what other managers are doing in similar
situations, thereby setting the atmosphere for public pension
fund managers to follow within similar management practices of
the industry.
As an outcome of the ERISA rule, there have been multiple
attempts to legislate a federally sponsored law which will
also regulated public pension funds in a similar fashion as
ERISA. Like ERISA, the proposed Public Employees Retirement
Income Security Act [PERISA] contains standards that would
require the fiduciary to (1) exercise the care, skill,
prudence and diligence of a prudent person, (2) select
investments solely in the interest of the participants and
beneficiaries of the plan, and (3) avoid certain type of
transactions. In addition, it would limit the public pension
plan from acquiring more than 10 percent of the fair market
27
"9 ibid, ERISA, 29CFR, Section 2550.404-1, 29 U.S.C.,
Section 1104 (a)1. 1974.
value of its assets in the securities, obligations and real
property of the contributing government. The federal
regulation, as it exists and is proposed, is one that
encourages accountability, attempting to protect against
conflicts of interest and protect fund assets. 20 This effort
has been strongly lobbied against by state and local
government advocacy groups.
Many state and localities do have specific legal guidelines
(legal lists) that limit the scope of public pension fund
investments. Each state has its own statute governing public
pension fund investment. However, most states set limit on
the amount of equity and real estate their public funds can
hold, to less than 10%. In 1976, for example, most large
state and local plans statutorially limited stocks to less
than 35% of their portfolios, and 10% of all public plans
could not invest in stocks at all. Other common restrictions
include limitations on investments in one company, in one
industry, or in mortgages. Some plans also mandate minimum
company size for pension fund investment, limit the percentage
of assets that can be held in cash reserve or set minimum
rates of returns to be earned on investments.2 1 However, many
state legislatures have recently revised their outdated
20 See U.S., Congress, House, A Bill to Provide Pension
Reform for State and Local Public Employee Retirement Systems,
96th Congress, 20th Session, 1980. H.R., pp. 53-79.6525
21 op cit, EBRI Issue Brief, Number 40, 1985.
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pension fund restrictions.
In developing investment strategies, public pension trustees
must always adhere to the requirement that retirement assets
are to be managed for the sole interest of the plan
beneficiaries. The Internal Revenue Service requires that
both public and private pension funds invest their assets for
the "exclusive benefit" of plan participants and
beneficiaries. However, in Revenue Ruling 69-495, 1969-2 CB,
88 the IRS interpreted "exclusive" as in effect meaning
"primary."
Thus, while public pension funds are not explicitly
regulated by federal law, there exist extensive standards both
industry specific as well as unique to the public sector of
pension funds. State and local statutes, legal lists, and
ERISA standards set the principles in which public pension
funds operate.
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Public Pension Fund Investment Management
Pension fund assets, on a general basis, are managed by bank
trust departments, insurance companies, independent investment
firms or in-house management. A large portion of all pension
assets are managed by a rather small proportion of portion of
these managers; they consist of fifteen bank trust
departments, twelve insurance companies, twenty four private
investment firms who manage ninety percent of the approximate
$2 trillion dollars in total pension fund assets.2 2
State and local employee public pension plans vary in there
administration. A small percentage of public pension plans
are administered by insurance comjanies.23 The great majority
of these plans are independently and directly operated, at
varying governmental levels and with varying employee coverage
groupings. Between the various states, the scope of coverage
differs widely. The extremes are Hawaii, with a single
statewide plan covering all public employees in the state, and
Pennsylvania, with 1413 separate plans.
Management of plan assets may be handled by the Treasurer of
the public body, by banks or trust companies, or by insurance
companies or more than one of them. However, in most pension
plans, ultimate authority for investing plan assets is
exercised or directed by the public employee retirement or
22 op cit, Landecker, 1982, p. 2 1 .
23 op cit, Ross, William B., 1982, p. 1 3 .
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investment boards themselves.
About two-third of state and local systems and almost all
states have statutes providing for boards of administrations
to make retirement system policy. These statutes also
designate the make-up of the board and how its members are to
be chosen.
Administering bodies are themselves usually dominated by
employee or governmental official members, with only
occasional membership including finance experts outside of
government. However, pension managers may use and rely on
outside financial advisors and investment managers (external
management) in setting investment policy or making individual
investments. Some states also provide for unified investment
management via investment boards, even where the retirement
features of systems may be administered independently.
Public pension funds tend to rely more heavily on in-house
management than private funds. This reflects, in part, the
history of more conservative investments by the public system.
Public pension funds have been able to function with small,
relatively non-competitive staff since active management has
played less of a role in the stock market, (a traditional area
for public pension fund investment). This explains to some
degree the large portion of public pension assets concentrated
in the bond market.24 In addition, public pension funds also
24 op cit, Litvak, 1981, p. 6 4 .
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rely heavily on outside investment managers. The Government
Finance Research Center's 1980 survey of retirement systems
found that external management was favored slightly for
corporate government bonds, internal management favored
moderately for mortgages, and external management favored
heavily for common stocks.
To varying degrees, in-house managers are not as experienced
as those in the private sector. This is in part a result of
the lower compensation for such jobs in state and local
sector. Nonetheless, internal and external pension managers
(both public and private) have strong professional biases
toward investing in the public stock and bond markets, largely
reflecting their training.
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Public Pension Fund Investment Policies
All state and local systems have statutes which provide for
boards of administration to make pension investment policies.
In some cases these boards do not have investment authority,
but in general, the boards make all investment policies. In
those cases where boards of administrations or investment
boards do not exist, investment policy-making normally resides
in a relevant state or local agency, like the department of
finance.
The real involvement of trustee boards, however, in setting
investment policy and reviewing investment decision is often
limited. This is usually due to the boards lack of expertise,
time or ready access to alternative sources of information and
judgement [Pennsylvania Public School Employees' Retirement
Fund, 19731. As a result, investment decisions are often made
by advisers. Decision-making, thus, is performed by in-house
but advised by external managers of the funds.
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Public Pension Fund Performance Criteria
There are two primary concerns when public pension funds
make a financial investment or set of investments (known as
the portfolio.) The first is the return on the investment--
how much money can be gained. The second is the associated
risks of the investment--the chance or degree of probability
of loss.
Periodic payments are earned by a public pension fund
through interest on debt investment (debt investment is the
issuance of a loan/debt on set terms and conditions, upon
which interest is earned) and dividends on equity investments
(equity investment is the cash investment into a venture
whereby the investor earns a share of the profits). In
addition, market value of the investment that will increase
(or decrease) in the future creates a capital gain (or loss)
earned on the investment. The combination of interest,
dividend earnings and changes in the market value represents
the measure of return which concerns the public pension fund
manager.
Return is a measure of expected performance of an investment
since the realized return is a function of events that cannot
be completely predicted. This uncertainty of future economic
events gives rise to the risk of a particular investment.
The risk of an investment is dependent upon the risk of the
proposed investment being financed (in relationship to other
potential investments), its sensitivity to the business cycle,
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the number of competitors and whether the money is invested as
debt or equity.
Risk can be assessed for the individual investment project
or as an aggregate to the overall investment portfolio. This
analysis is known as portfolio diversification. Some risk can
be minimized relative to the overall portfolio. This
financial analysis of risk has several implications for public
pension fund managers [Litvak, 1981].
Investors want to both maximize their expected returns and
minimize risk at any time. However, there is an inherent
trade-off between expected return and risk. Higher expected
returns is accompanied with higher risk. This is the
fundamental concept of investment. But, the promise of a
higher return does not always materialize, thus, presenting
the adverse result (or risk) of an investment.
In addition to the risk-return standard analysis of an
investment proposal, public pension fund managers must also
consider the liquidity and management/transaction cost of the
proposed project.
Liquidity is the ease (low cost) with which a portfolio
investment can be converted to cash. The need for liquidity
will depend upon the degree to which the investor needs to
draw on its portfolio for operating funds (benefit payments in
the case of public pension funds) and/or sell investment
quickly in order to offset poor portfolio management
investments or take advantage of new information.
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Management/transaction costs are the expenses incurred in
evaluating, purchasing, monitoring and selling investments.
Investment performance is also measured or compared against
other investment opportunities in the market. Investment and
investment portfolio are compared on the basis of the ratio of
their desirable characteristics (return) to their undesirable
characteristics (risk, liquidity, management costs). By
comparing an investment proposal to other opportunities in the
market, the investor looks at the going rate of compensation
to an investor for assuming a specific amount of investment
risk. An investment "hurdle rate"--the return it must promise
to be competitive with other investment opportunities--must
equal the sum of the compensation necessary for each of its
undesirable financial characteristic.2s
A noncompetitive or concessionary investment is one where
the expected return is not commensurate with the other
undesirable characteristics of the investment. That is, the
competitive price of risk, liquidity, management costs, is not
being paid to the investor. A concession in the form of not
demanding this compensation has to be made if the investment
is to take place. It may be that the investment is of average
risk but below average return, high risk-low return, above
average risk-average return, etc. This has been the analysis
applied to social benefit investments proposals.
25 op cit, Litvak, 1981, p.31.
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The primary criteria for public pension fund investment,
therefore, are a composite of the risk-return analysis, a
liquidity of investment analysis, an examination of the cost
of management associated with the investment, and lastly,
appraisal of the overall investment relative to comparable
investment measures elsewhere. These investment criteria form
the basis pension managers use in investment decision-making.
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Summary:
Extensive standards and constraints exists which define the
scope of public pension funds and their investments. Although
distinct in operation from private plans, public plans operate
within the pension fund industry, thereby judged implicitly
and explicitly by the standards and constraints of private and
public sector pension plans.
These standards combined with financial performance
standards of investments (risk and return analysis) further
define the investment criteria of public pension plans. In
analyzing an investment proposal, public pension funds must
consider many factors ranging from risk, to liquidity, to
opportunity costs, which help form the investment decision-
making criteria. These factors determine the acceptance or
rejection of an investment proposal.
Proposed investments are also scrutinized based on their
conformity to public pension fund standards stipulated in
state and local statutes, legal lists and prudent man
standards. On an industry-wide standard, the fundamental test
of prudence must prove an investment to be a safe, sound and
prudent. Since the ultimate goal of a pension plan is to
provide retirement benefits, investments must offer
competitive rates of returns which do not jeopardize the
existing capital stock. This feature has affected the
investment behavior of pension managers, resulting in a
conservative approach in reviewing investment risk and return.
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The conservative nature of pension investment has identified
strategies for investment which serve to maximize returns with
minimal risks. Where this is not the case, concessionary
investment is perceived. Social benefit investment practice
of public pension funds has been labeled concessionary
investment practice. This analysis of social benefit
investment will be further explored in Chapter Two.
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Chapter Two
Social Benefit Investment
Origin and Definition:
In recent years, due to the reorganization of the financial
industry and the massive growth in pension assets, many voices
have begun to advocate new, more diversified uses for pension
funds.2
Traditional pension investment27 practices have been called
into question for several reasons. First, the poor financial
performance of past pension fund investments has fueled the
pension fund investment debate at all levels of government,
corporate boardrooms, union halls and among other interest
groups. Secondly, due to their enormous structural power in
the economy, public officials, corporations and unions are
realizing pension fund's potential for supporting certain
sectors of the economy which need capital. Thirdly,
traditional investing methods are under scrutiny because they
have ignored much of the social and economic impact of their
investments. These conditions have contributed to the search
for new investment strategies.
26 op cit, EBRI Issues Brief #170, 1985.
27 Traditional investment practice under prudent investment
standard is the investment of pension assets in government
securities, stocks and bonds.
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Dialogue generated around the "social" aspect of pension
investment were presented in books by Peter Drucker, Jeremy
Rifkin and Randy Barber. Drucker introduced the contention
that employees own, control and should direct pension fund
capital.2 Rifkin/Barber, tracing social investing back to
church and university activism between 1968-72, argued that
church and university activism succeeded in introducing a "new
lexicon, which has broaden the definition of investment to
include social and moral consideration in economic decision-
making." They stated:
Twenty years ago, the term social investment was used
more as a throwaway line and conjured up the image of
token do-goodism and charity. Today, it has come more
and more to represent an alternative way of looking at
economic decision-making and planning."
These books prompted the placement of pension funds on the
political agenda in the late 1970's and early 80's.
The conscious design of investment policies which consider
the social and economic impact of pension fund investment, as
well as the associated risk and rate of return, is often
referred to as "social benefit investment."
Social benefit investment as a topic of research has
generated diverse discussion. Literature on this topic refers
28 See Drucker, Peter, The Unseen Revolution:How Pension
Fund Socialism Came to America, Harper & Row, New York, 1976.
3 Rifkin, Jeremy and Randy Barber, The North Will Rise
Again, Beacon Press, Boston, 1978, p. 1 6 1 .
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to social benefit investment under various labels.3 0 These
labels include "strategic investing," "alternative
investment," "development investment," and "social
investment." These labels all cover one key concept: the
introduction of social and political considerations in the
investment decision-making process of pension fund investment.
To date, the appropriateness of social benefit investment
policy has generated more debate than the actual
implementation of the approach. Much of this is due to the
polarization of positions the concept has generated. Social
activists favor the concept, while academicians, investment
adviser, legal counsel, the Department of Labor, and others,
dismiss it as being imprudent." Opponents attribute the
primary conflict of this approach to the lack of established
measures, under current standards, in which to weigh the risks
and return of the social or political aspect of an investment.
The call for social benefit investment of pension funds is
offered by a spectrum of voices. Furthest from the
traditional investment approach are those who advocate
investing pension funds for the expressed purpose of bettering
society, with return and risk being of secondary
* See Drucker, 1976; Kenneth Rosen, 1976; Rifkin/Barber,
1978; Alicia Munnell, 1979 and 1983; John Peterson and Catherine
Spain, 1980; and Robert Schur, 1981.
3 McMahon, John, "Developing a Real Estate Social
Investment Policy", article in Real Estate Finance Journal,
Summer 1985, p. 3 9 .
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considerations. This position encourages pension managers to
consider factors other than, and often in place of,
traditional tests of prudence, (i.e. investment return, safety
of principal or diversification) in making an investment
decision. This position, however, has not found widespread
support.
More commonly, is the call for diversification of pension
investments to serve functions beyond the accumulation of
assets. This view encourages pension managers or trustees to
consider non-traditional investments. So long as such
investments pay competitive rates of returns, pension fund
managers may willingly consider them. In this view the social
or political aspect of the investment is of consequential
importance. Instead, the emphasis is on diversification of
pension assets.32 This approach may result in the use of
pension funds as a capital resource for residential mortgages,
equity investment in real estate outright, or venture capital
for small business or new high technology enterprises. These
investment vehicles, while non-traditional investment mediums,
may or may not extend social or political benefits to society
at large.
32 Diversification of pension assets is the attempt to
diffuse adverse affects of high risks of some portion of a
portfolio with other less risky investments to enhance the
overall performance of the portfolio.
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I shall use the term "social benefit investment" to refer to
that investment strategy that explicitly factors in a broad
range of social and/or economic goals in the investment
process. This approach aims to illustrate that
diversification of public pension funds in the non-traditional
investment of affordable housing may offer competitive rates
of return and serve a social end. However, a social benefit
investment strategy may not be the best tool to achieve
diversification objectives.
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Social Benefit Investment Strategies
Advocates of both traditional and social benefit investment
policies recognize that the ultimate purpose of a pension fund
is to provide a steady, secure retirement income. The
preservation of pension capital is the main concern for
pension fund managers in developing investment policies. The
traditional pension investment strategy, characteristic of
capital investors, is geared toward receiving an optimal rate
of return on an investment with minimum amount of risk,
regardless of the social or economic consequences of an
investment.
In contrast, a social benefit investment strategy identifies
and purposely targets capital investment to projects that i)
have a capital need that can not or will not be fulfilled by
traditional financial resources and ii) create social benefits
in addition to a secure retirement income [Litvak, 19811. In
cases where unsatisfied credit demands for projects which are
otherwise feasible, the flow of pension capital into such
investments should then result in greater resources for these
types of investments (usually high risk), as well as address
the social needs of a region.[Petersen/Spain, 19801
Existing examples of social benefit investment strategies
identify approaches that are:
* designed to reward or punish particular forms of investment
behavior
* designed to expand capital placement in particular sectors
* designed to provide direct benefits to pension fund members
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The oldest strategy in social benefit investment is designed
to reward or punish particular forms of investment behavior.
This approach incorporates the economic interest or
philosophical preferences of pension plan members in the
investments of pension funds. Rifkin/Barber articulate this
strategy; they discuss investments in securities of
corporations which are endorsed if such investments do not
conflict with pension members' philosophical or economic
interest. The prime example of this strategy is the rejection
of investment securities in those corporations which deal with
countries that follow discriminatory or repressive policies,
such as South Africa.
The goal of a strategy designed to expand capital placement
in a particular sector aims to provide capital that otherwise
would not be available to that sector, without making
financial concessions to the pension fund. To accomplish this
goal, pension investments must be targeted to fill a capital
gap rather than displace existing capital investment in a
particular sector [Litvak, 19811.
Strategies designed to provide direct social benefits to
pension plan members encourage job creation, localized
economic development and housing. An often cited example of
private pension fund utilizing this strategy is the employment
of unionized construction labor in residential mortgage
investments. An example of public pension funds utilizing
this approach is New York City public employees pension
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purchase of restructured municipal bonds; these events serve
as examples of pension fund investments providing outright
social benefits.
The strategies employed to meet the call for social benefit
investment of pension funds have been critiqued because of the
difficulty to assess the gains made by this particular
approach. No econometric models exist to measure social or
political benefits nor are there standard criteria to judge
social benefit investment. The standard financial risk-return
analyses of investment vehicles is the current measure used to
weigh investments, and as a result, this analysis often
assesses social benefit investment as high risk for average
returns or more bleakly, high risks with low returns [Litvak,
19811.
Nonetheless, social benefit investment strategies have been
implemented. However, the manner in which public pension
funds implement the strategies to achieve social benefits has
varied. Some may establish a social benefit investment policy
as a guideline for pension managers or trustees to utilize
when identifying investment vehicles. This allows for the
development of investment strategies which target pension fund
invested. In many cases, a social benefit investment policy
is the result of plan membership demanding the use of their
pension funds to address a specific need.
The manner in which pension plans have given priority to
social benefit investment vehicles has not been systematic.
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Pension plans do not compile a list of goals and then rank
them according to some level of preference. In some cases, a
pension plan will identify a goal and will accept any number
of strategies to accomplish their specific objective in
meeting this goal. An example is a pension plans' goal to
invest in local economic development. This broad goal has
potential for multiple investment vehicles to achieve economic
development--venture capital for new, high technology
business, small business start-up loans, housing related
investment instruments, neighborhood revitalization, etc. The
point being the commitment to social benefit investment.
Social benefit investment vehicles which result in social
political, or economic benefits include:
* meeting housing needs of plan participants
* increasing local employment opportunities
* providing venture capital to small business
* supporting goals of worker rights and safety
* supporting alternative energy development"3
Recent discussion has suggested investment vehicles which
encourage local employment opportunities, neighborhood
revitalization or support of existing economic sectors.*
However, the most common investment vehicle has been the use
of pension funds in residential mortgage investments.
3 Peterson, John E. and Catherine L. Spain, Alternative
Investing by State and Local Pension Funds: Concepts, Issues
and Policies, Government Finance Research Center, Washington,
1980, p. 6 .
* See Jesse Jackson statement before the Democratic
Convention, Summer 1988.
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The pressure to adopt investment policies which result in
social benefit have been felt by both public and private
pension funds. The rigidly regulated private pension industry
maintains a skeptical approach in practicing social benefit
investment; much of this is due to their conservative
investment behavior. Yet, there have been instances where
private pension funds have initiated social benefit
investment. Union pension plans, members of the private
sector, have taken the lead in implementing a social benefit
investment strategy, employing investment in residential
mortgage investment or outright housing development
[Landecker, 1982] This investment strategy benefits union
labor (hence, plan participants) not only with employment
creation which results from this type of activity but, as
recipients of the end product, housing.
Public pension funds have been faced with increasing public
pressure to expand existing investment practice to include
investments which address local needs, particularly housing.
The potential role of public pension funds as a capital
resource has been identified by many public officials and
local interest groups. These groups have given rise to
inquiries regarding the "public" duty of public pension funds,
and whether public pension investments should benefit plan
participants at present and in the future. The call for
public pension funds to invest in housing invokes the use of a
social benefit investment strategy.
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Public Pension Funds and Social Benefit Investment:
State and local pension funds account for nearly 38% of the
nations $2 trillion of pension assets." In year-end 1987, the
aggregate of state and local pension funds were invested as
follows: 34% in corporate equity, 58% in bonds, 4% in cash
(which includes demand deposits, certificates of deposit and
open market paper), and most of the remainder in mortgages and
mortgage-backed securities." This distribution reflects a
growing trend toward greater diversification. Traditionally,
state and local pension assets were heavily invested in
federal government securities or those of their own sponsoring
government.
In general, public employee pension funds have been more
receptive to social benefit investments than private pension
funds, especially where social (non-investment related)
benefits are a motivating factor." Social benefit investing
began to influence the public pension fund community in the
mid-1970's when several public employee pension funds were
* This is the ratio of total public pension funds to total
pension assets; $521 billion divided by the total sum of $2
trillion.
36 Employee Benefit Research Institute, Issues Brief, No.
80,Wasington, D.C., July 1988; also see Alicia Munnell,
"Pitfalls of Social Investing" Federal Reserve Bank of Boston,
Massachusetts, 1983, p. 2 2 .
" Pickman, James and Benson F. Roberts, "Pension Fund
Investments: New Mechanisms and Techniques for Stimulating
Mortgage Participation" in Resources For Community-Based
Economic Development, Vol 2, No.12, December 1984.
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asked to bail out bankrupt local governments--the most viable
example being the commitment of New York City public employees
pension fund purchase of restructured municipal bonds.
Public pension funds are not legally required to justify
their investments under the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA). Consequently, most social benefit
investment is confined to public pension plans. Proponents of
social benefit investment policy argue that conventional
application of the prudent man rule solicited by ERISA, and
other statutory laws impose such conservative investment
standards that the use of pension capital is severely
constrained. Unlike private pensions, public pension funds
experience: more flexibility within the investment regulatory
system; greater ability to introduce amendments to relax
strict state or local statutory laws, and; greater flexibility
to consider investments viewed as imprudent by private pension
fund standards.
The receptivity of public pension funds to practice social
benefit investment has historically been in large part because
public pension funds are subject to state and local political
pressures to address local needs and political pressures to
invest these funds locally.
Public pension plans have been under strong political
pressure to undertake activities benefiting their
constituents. Public officials are responding to the growing
public awareness of pension fund investment and thus,
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incorporating pension funds as an issue for political agendas.
The enormous structural power of pension funds in the economy,
as a whole, has motivated public officials to consider the
impact pension funds may have if targeted to certain sectors
of the economy which are in need of capital.
State and local pension plans are moving rapidly in the
direction of investing funds locally. Since 1980, pensions in
at least 14 states have announced plans to increase local
investment. Most are concentrated in local mortgage markets
but some plans are earmarking funds for local business
development."
The pressure to use public pension funds within the local
jurisdiction of cities and counties has been expressed by
public officials, public sector employees and public interest
groups (i.e. community development corporations, development
agencies, etc.) Much of the pressure has been directed
towards investment of public pension funds in the development
of affordable housing, community revitalization, and community
economic development. 3 9 These investment vehicles have been
identified as ventures which address local public needs.
Various types of social benefit investment vehicles for
public pension funds have emerged which include: investment in
" op cit, EBRI Issues Brief #170, 1985.
"9 See Robert Schur, "The Housing Crisis: Strategy for
Public Pension Funds" Conference on Alternative State and Local
Policies, 1981, and entire issue of Community Economics, No.16,
Fall 1988.
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residential mortgages, either through outright equity
participation, debt financing or mortgage-backed securities;
venture capital--in the form of "seed" money for small
business development or a start-up capital for locally-based
enterprises; and loan pool certificates for other social
investments such as community revitalization, infrastructure
rehabilitation.
A relatively new vehicle of social benefit investment
strategy is credit enhancement. This vehicle does not require
outright investment of pension funds in any particular
investment. Rather, the key behind this strategy is the
pledging of collateral by a pension plan in support of non-
traditional investment ventures." This pledge serves to
leverage the credit value of a development proposal. In the
case of default, the public pension fund would be obligated to
cover the debt liability. This vehicle has only recently gain
credibility among advocates of social benefit investment as a
means to reinforce investment value of non-traditional
investments.
Of the above mentioned investment vehicles, the primary
vehicle for social benefit investment of public pension funds
has been investment in residential mortgages within a given
state or local region. While other investment instruments
have been utilized in an attempt to address social benefit
* Barber, Randy, "Pension Funds and Community Investment"
interview essay in Community Economics, No. 16, Fall 1988, p.2.
53
investment, residential mortgages have been the main
investment vehicle for both public and private pension funds.
The connection between social benefit investment of public
pension funds and housing or housing-related instruments
initiated from the timing of the two concerns as a national
interest. As simultaneous national concerns a natural
convergence between the two was assumed: one as a financial
resource, the other as a financial investment instrument.
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Public Pension Funds and Affordable Housing Development:
The late 1970's marked a period of public interest in the
social and political impacts of pension fund investments,
which coincided with a period of rapidly rising house prices
and mortgage interest rates. The concurrent emergence of
housing and pension investments as national concerns coalesced
a presumed correlation between the two issues. The provision
of affordable housing, consequently became a goal of those
advocating the use of pension funds for social purposes
[Munnell, 1983].
In the 1980's, concerns persist about the continued rise in
house prices, the affordability of housing and issues
regarding the traditional financing institutions and their
role in homeownership. Simiarly, the rapid growth of pension
assets continues to maintain public attention on the potential
and untapped capital resource pension funds possess.
State and local government face national crises in their
ability to provide affordable housing to local residents.
Public pension funds have been viewed by many as the prime
resource to realize home ownerhsip.
In their 1982 report, the President's Commission on Housing
stated: "The current crisis in housing is primarily a crisis
in the financing of housing." Although disputes over
regulation were argued, some recommendations which could
facilitate the usage of public pension funds in housing
finance were issued. These recommendations were designed to
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eliminate inadvertent and unreasonable technical constraints
for pension investment in housing related instruments such as
mortgages or mortgage-backed securities.
The investment in housing-related instruments that furthered
other "social" objectives was not proposed, such as below-
market rate home mortgage loans, despite intense pressure from
some housing lobbies. There was some support from within the
committee for proposals to allow pension funds to acquire
mortgage assets as long as these assets carried yields at
least as high as the average rate of return on fund
investments. This practice, however, was recognized as below-
market-rate investment in disguise (in a rising-rate
environment) and not condoned.41
Two main recommendations specific to public pension funds
were offered:
* States should be encouraged to develop program strategies
and regulations that facilitate housing investment by public
pension funds.
* The National Conference on Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws should recommend changes to state legal investment -
statutes to provide authority for regulated fiduciaries to
invest in conventional mortgage-backed securities meeting a
common set of reasonable investment criteria.
These recommendations illustrate a growing recognition of
public pension funds and their role in housing finance.
Seeing that most of public pension investment under a social
benefit investment policy has been in residential mortgages or
mortgage-related instruments, understanding the mortgage
41 op cit, Florida, Richard, 1986, p. 171.
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markets, therefore is vital in comprehending the housing
industry. Mortgages are vital to housing for two major
reasons i) a large majority of housing sales and construction
is financed through debt, thereby making the provision of
housing crucially dependent upon the availability and cost of
credit, and ii) residential mortgage financing is one of
largest uses of available credit in the US economy; about a
fifth of all funds are raised in the US credit markets and one
third of funds are raised by the nations' private non-
financial sector."
The analysis of pension fund participation in mortgages and
mortgage-backed securities, thus, is critical in understanding
whether pension fund investments actually i) result in more
affordable housing capital and ii) if social benefit
investment policy is the tool which promotes the use of
pension fund capital in this area of investment.
42 ibid, p. 170.
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Social Benefit Investment Vehicles in Housing:
It has been suggested that the investment of pension funds
in housing is eminently suitable for public pension funds
[Schur, 1981]. Schur contends public pension funds are able
to make long-term committments, without minimal need for
liquidity or concerns with intermediate fluctuations in
interest rates. Furthermore, housing as an investment offers
long-term increases in value which have outpaced the erosion
of the dollar through inflation.
In this analysis, public pension funds are viewed as
"patient money" in which the financial needs of the pension
are projected over the life of its membership. As such,
pension funds are not heavily concerned with short-term
fluctuations in return or cash flow. The logic follows that
public pension funds, therefore do not have a great need for
liquidity as do other investors such as banks.
In addition, the affects of fluctuating interest rates are
diffused through housing investment since real estate
investments, in general, offer a strong hedge to inflation.
That portion of a pension fund, therefore, targeted in housing
investment could have some protection to risk. Housing in
this case would be a prudent balance for the highly volatile
and disappointing performance of stocks and bonds.
According to Schur, the changing cost of money which
threatens most financial institutions and investors does not
adversely affect public pension funds. The funds are directly
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a product of workers and governmental cash contributions. At
any given rate of return which is deemed adequate to fund the
actuarially" anticipated costs of the pension participants,
pension funds need not worry about the fluctuations in the
rates of return of other investments. The implication from
this analysis is that a pension fund can with impunity invest
in fixed-rate securities, similar to the dissipating fixed-
rate real estate mortgage.
Housing as an investment vehicle for public pension funds
falls under the category of non-traditional investments which
may generate social benefits. As such, it qualifies as an
investment vehicle for social benefit investment. However,
for public pension fund investment in housing to be meaningful
and effective, i.e. resulting in a social benefit for the
general public, the term "housing" must be clearly defined.
Public pension funds to be considered a "social investment"
must also be tailored and targeted to meet the needs of a
particular sector in a state or local municipality.
Therefore, if affordable housing is being advocated under the
banner of social benefit investment of public pension funds,
then these funds must be made available to that sector, (low
and moderate income residents), which has an un-met capital
demands.
*3 An actuary is a person whose work is figuring out risks,
rates, premiums, etc, for pension funds.
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Public pension fund investment in residential mortgages and
related instruments range from a multitude of whole loan
products to a wide spectrum of mortgage-backed securities.
Residential mortgages suggested under a social benefit
investment strategy include graduated mortgage payments,
equity participation mortgages and shared equity mortgages.
Other suggested vehicles include a revolving loan fund for
rehabilitation loans, and loan pool certificates aimed at
pooling city and state monies with pension monies. However,
the most common investment vehicle under the advocacy of
social benefit continues to be mortgage-backed securities.
Exiting financial instruments such as mortgage-backed
securities allow public pension fund participation in the
purchase of first and second mortgages or mortgage securities.
These securities have facilitated a move of public pension
capital into the capital markets and the development of a
secondary mortgage market which serves as a medium for pension
fund investments.
A growing participation of public pension funds in mortgage
or mortgage-backed instruments has occurred over the last
fifteen years. The biggest motivation for public pension
support of the mortgage market has come from the creation of
several new capital market instruments, either backed directly
with government guarantees or representing highly protected
pools of conventional mortgages.
Mortgage backed securities pools were a major innovator in
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the mortgage market by early 1970 with GNMA. Total mortgage
investment accounted for nearly 13% of the holdings of state
and local pensions by mid 1983 [Munnell, 1983]. The most
popular form of social benefit investment in housing among
state-administered pension funds has been the purchase of
mortgage-backed securities of GNMA, actually targeted at low
and moderate income residents.
Some proponents of social benefit investment and traditional
pension managers have lauded the soundness and prudence of
mortgage-backed securities and support such social benefit
investment strategies which make use of these types of
securities.4 * With the growing secondary mortgage markets
which trades mortgage-backed securities, concerns regarding
the liquidity of pension fund investment, security of pension
fund investments and competitive investment returns have been
reduced.
Mortgage-backed securities yield competitive returns,
especially over similar quality corporate bonds. These types
of securities are also low risk; they are guaranteed by either
the federal government or a private mortgage guarantee
insurance company or federally linked agencies.
However, many researchers have argued that pension fund
participation in mortgage-backed securities 1) do not increase
See Pension and Mortgages: Housing Investment
Opportunities for the 80's, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development, Washington, D.C., 1983.
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the aggregate supply of mortgage funds or mortgage credit
within a particular state or municipality 2) displace other
mortgage investors in the capital market and 3) do not
necessarily increase the resource of housing capital for those
seeking capital whom traditional financial institutions are
hesitant to commit. [Litvak,1981; Munnell, 1983; Peterson,
1984]
Like U.S. government bonds and Treasury bills, mortgage-
backed securities have a ready market on and off the nation's
securities exchanges. There is the argument that public
pension fund investment in these securities produces a flow of
funds into housing finance which simply displaces money from
other sources. [Schur, 1981; Litvak, 1981; Munnell, 1983]
However, it is not clear that this is true.
It appears that mortgage-backed securities satisfy the
social benefit analysis of non-traditional investment vehicles
for public pension funds, in the simplest sense. Yet if one
weighs in social or political factors, in addition to simple
risk/return analyses, then this investment vehicle fails to
qualify as social benefit investment.
Public pension fund participation in mortgage-backed
securities has not resulted in an increase in the pool of
mortgage capital. One must, therefore, question if their
participation expands the overall resource of mortgage
capital, if it lessens the cost of capital as a result of
their participation and if their participation creates
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affordable mortgage capital for homeownership.
Some argue that social benefit investment in housing
presents a conflict of interest, within the regulations that
govern public pension funds. The established guidelines which
outline the scope of interest a fiduciary may support. The
primary interest is the protection of pension benefits and the
investment of pension funds in vehicles which benefit the plan
participants explicitly. Clearly, public pension investment
of residential mortgages not directly aimed at benefiting the
plan participants creates a potential claim for conflict of
interest. However, there is support in administrative
rulings, case law and legal commentaries for the notion that
an investment can provide collateral benefits to third parties
if its primary purpose is to benefit the retirement system
participants.*5
Where the introduction of social objectives has served to
dilute the primary objective of pension funds, the Department
of Labor has taken the position that such conduct by a plan
fiduciary is imprudent. However, if the socially beneficial
investment meets objective investment criteria which are
appropriate to the financial goals of the portfolio, it may be
considered in the same manner as other investments which these
criteria. That is, if after evaluating the economic factors
in a transaction, two investments appear to be equally
4s op cit, Litvak, 1981, pg. 59.
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desireable, then social benefits may be considered in
determining which to select.
The investment of public pension funds in housing, under a
social benefit investment policy, appears to create a conflict
of goals between pension funds and the development of
affordable housing. Total return for public pension funds is
of paramount consideration. Investment which compromises a
maximum return jeopardizes the existing stock of pension
assets, threatens future benefit payouts, and may be in legal
conflict with the legislature which regulates this industry.
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Summary:
Social benefit investment is a complex investment strategy.
While the past 15 years have witnessed an evolution in the
practice of social benefit investment, it is evident that the
lack of public pension fund participation in more social
benefit investment vehicles suggests that the condition under
which this strategy may develop has not yet been realized.
Residential mortgages have been the primary investment
vehicle utilized by pension funds to address housing
development. Investment in housing has been realized through
the investment of pension assets in mortgages and, more
commonly, mortgage-backed securities.
While favored among the existing vehicles for social benefit
investment, mortgage-backed securities, as a strategy, do not
accomplish the social goal of affordable housing development.
Much of the support for this particular type of investment
stems from the low risks they exhibit as an investment
vehicle. This aspect has persuaded conservative pension
managers to support this particular type of investment labeled
social benefit investment.
Public pension investment opportunities exists for housing
development. However, many of the current investment vehicles
targeted under social benefit investment fall short of
extending social, political or economic benefits. Various
factors exist which impede the implementation of social
benefit investment as a strategy for public pension funds.
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These factors include: institutional factors, performance
measures, legislative charters and investment issues. Chapter
Three will explore these obstacles, highlighting the
fundamental problems in the advocacy of social benefit
investment. The presumed match between public pension funds
and housing development operates in a complex environment of
strict standards, regulations and objectives which exists
among the associated industries which comprise the endorsement
of social benefit investment.
66
Chapter Three
The Link Between Public Pension Fund Investments
and Advocating A Social Benefit Investment Strategy in Housing
Public attention has focused upon the massive size of public
pension assets and their projected growth. The current
estimate of five hundred and twenty-one billion dollars in
public pension assets easily creates a vision of massive
wealth. This vision has led many to view these funds as an
untapped capital resource, potentially capable of serving an
innovative role in the financing of various investment
projects, particularly housing. As a result, the use of these
funds is being sought. For many in the public sector, (i.e.
public officials and agencies, community organizations, etc) a
social benefit investment strategy has been viewed as an
instrument which could facilitate the flow of these funds into
local investment projects.
Social benefit investment has evolved from a strategy whose
aims was to gain greater accountability of pension investments
to a strategy which requires the assessment of investment
risks and returns as well as the consequential social good an
investment may produce. While this application is more
explicitly defined, social benefit investment has not been
widely adopted within the pension industry. Yet, it has been
the primary strategy of those outside the pension industry
seeking the use of these funds.
A connection between public pension fund investment and the
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advocacy of social benefit investment has presumably links
these funds to social investments, such as housing. Yet, no
clear correlation has been offered by advocates of this
proposal as to why public pension funds should be used in
socially beneficial investments, especially in those cases
where investment risks are high (i.e. affordable housing).
On the one hand, critics of this proposal have identified
the pitfalls of social benefit investment [Munnel, 1983] On
the other hand, supportive research has offered various
investment vehicles, particularly in housing, which offer
diversification of pension assets and achieve the 'goal of
social benefit investments--i.e. the use of pension funds in
vehicles which promote a social good and are viable investment
projects [Rosen, 1978; Litvak, 1981; Schur, 1981].
Yet, the call for social benefit investment in housing is
more complex than its appears. This strategy solicits the
comprehension of the discrete components it incorporates.
Each component--pension funds, investment, and housing--
references a distinct field of application. To understand the
relationship among pension funds, investment and housing,
extensive knowledge of the objectives, standards and
regulations particular to each field is essential. This
knowledge is necessary to understand how the three terms are
related and how that relationship impinges on the realization
of social benefit investment.
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The Debate:
Despite a increasing interest and involvement of public
pension funds in social benefit investment46 , the new direction
of pension investing that social benefit investment proposes
raises difficult issues and concerns that have not been
resolved since the initial debate began in 1976.
The primary debate regarding social benefit investment
relates to the appropriateness of this strategy within the
constructs of public pension standards. Much of the
reluctance of public pension fund managers to practice social
benefit investments has stemmed from a belief that prudent
financial standards would necessarily be lowered. Opponents
have argued that social benefit investing will impair
portfolio performance, violate state and federal law, and be
impossible to implement. Advocates of social benefit
investment have frequently contributed to this criticism by
failing to understand the implications of their proposals
given the financial standards that pension funds must meet.
Other advocates have ended up at another extreme by proposing
investments that, while financially sound, are so
unimaginative that they merely displace existing investors.
46 Kennedy, Gordon and Eugene B. Burroughs, "Adopting an
Institutional Real Estate Investment Policy" in Real Estate
Finance Journal, Summer 1985, p. 52.
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Advocates of social benefit investment strategies suggests
that the key in realizing the goals of this strategy is in
concentrating on sectors and enterprises which have been
underfinanced due to gaps and inefficiencies in the financial
systems.[Litvak,1981; Schur, 1981; Munnel, 1983] Although
this recommendation was more appropriate in the early 1980's,
the more recent innovations in the capital market have made
available a large pool of capital resource for various types
of investments, making the argument of capital shortage
difficult to endorse. However, inefficiencies in the
financial market remain. Under this analysis, social benefit
investment may be a mechanism to amend market failure. The
debate arises, however, whether public pension funds are a
suitable financial resource to finance sectors or enterprises
that are not being financed by the -arket.
In regards to affordable housing, many proponents of social
benefit investment view this strategy as an instrument by
which public pension funds may be streamlined to finance non-
traditional investments, satisfying a social need outright and
providing financing of housing development. In this analysis,
the point of debate centers on whether public pension funds
are indeed a resource for local housing finance, given the
constraints of the pension industry and existing financial
resources (both in traditional financial institutions, such as
banks, and in capital investors.)
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The fundamental debate centers on whether or not social
benefit investment supplements or interferes with the primary
objective of pension funds--the ensuring the long-term safety
and soundness of existing public pension funds. With so few
examples of social benefit investment, and persistent dispute
over the appropriateness of this investment strategy, it is
clear that there exist obstacles beyond the simple impediment
of copious debate which impede the implementation of a social
benefit investment strategy by the public pension industry.
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Identifying Obstacles to Social Benefit Investment
As previously stated, much research has criticized social
benefit investment. Under "rule of thumb" prudent man
analysis, social benefit investment fails to compensate
pension fund investors for assuming high investment risks by
offsetting it with a high return--instead, social benefit
investment usually offers high risk with average to low
returns.
The nature of this type of research has, for the most part,
utilized existing measures of analysis to assess the
appropriateness of social benefit investment. That is,
researchers have utilized financial measures of return, which
generate finite numbers for analysis, gauged these numbers to
existing statutes, policies and standards for public pension
funds and standards for capital investors, and issued a
judgement of the appropriateness of social benefit investment
under these criteria. However, it has been acknowledged that
the lack of a criterion which measures the value of the
social, economic or political gains a social benefit
investment may offer makes it difficult to truly assess social
benefit investment [Litvak, 1981].
Supporters of social benefit investment strategy for housing
suggest alternative investment approaches: targeting capital
investment--by sector, by region or by product; suggesting
investment vehicles in which to invest pension funds to meet a
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social need (i.e. loan pool certificates for affordable
housing development); or recommending the formation of
intermediary agencies which may facilitate social benefit
investment.
The nature of this advocacy requires the entry of public
pension funds into un-precedented waters. Innovative
investment is solicited. Yet, historically, pension investors
have pursued a traditional investment behavior that invests in
vehicles which have been proven safe, sound and prudent.
Social benefit investment falls far from this measure of
safety.
With so few examples of social benefit investment, and
persistent dispute over the appropriateness of this investment
strategy, it is clear that obstacles exists. The lack of
measures, precedent and consensus in assessing the
appropriateness of social benefit investment may lead one to
conclude that these have been the primary obstacles to the
implementation of this strategy. However, I would suggest
there are institutional, ideological and practical obstacles
that exist which have impinged the realization of a social
benefit investment strategy.
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Institutional Obstacles
Institutional standards include those standards for the
pension industry and financial investment industry. Each has
a distinct scope of operation with instituted regulations
which monitor the management and investment behavior of those
who adminster funds within these industries.
Chapter Two discussed in detail the distinct restrictions
and criteria which exist within the pension industry. The
institutional demand for safety, soundness and prudence--as
established by federal law, local statutes and pension board
guidelines--forms the basis of pension fund management and
investment. Jeopardy to existing pension assets, through poor
management, poor investment vehicles or high risk investments
is not endorsed.
Two key institutional factors within public pension
industry--management standards and performance measures--form
base measures which pension managers must consider in the
every day operation of pension funds.
Management dominates the investment policies and portfolio
choices of pension funds. An important factor is the
delegation of managerial responsibility for investment of
funds. Most public pension funds have delegated this
authority to banks and to investment managers. Influence of
banks and investment managers is illustrated in the
orientation of public pension investment vehicles--traditional
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stocks and bonds. Public pension managers are trained and
accustomed to investing in the top 500 corporate stocks and
bonds; this training makes it difficult to re-orientate them
to look at non-traditional investment vehicles, such as
residential mortgages.
Performance measures of public pensions, emphasizes short-
term portfolio gains rather than providing an investment
evaluation based on long-term risk-adjusted returns. Optimal
investment performance are related to short-term performances
of the stock portfolio. As such, social benefit investment
vehicles are often negatively assessed because the investment
does not measure up to the triple A grade corporate bond of a
particular investment quarter.
Financial investment standards further define the parameter
in which social benefit investment must be assessed.
Investments made to promote social benefit investment generate
financial, social and political returns. However, the social
and political returns are difficult and often impossible to
measure in dollar returns. Under simple prudent man analysis,
social benefit investment fails to compensate pension funds in
a manner that can be accounted by a project manager to the
overall portfolio. If the pension manager evaluates an
investment on the basis of financial returns, the additional
criteria of social benefit often does not receive the
appropriate assessment of such an investment.
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Additionally, legislative charters presents an institutional
obstacle which stems from state and local governments.
Restrictive legislative charters may limit the types of
investments pension funds can invest in. Most often state and
local statutes prevent investment of public funds in common
stocks and bonds, mortgage restricted to conventional
holdings, or specify a set percentage of any particular type
of investment. In more recent times, many states have begun
to re-evaluate restrictive laws and modifying them to allow
pension fund investment in areas which had not been allowable
prior to these changes. This change has been viewed as a
positive step towards encouraging social benefit investments.
Institutional Terminology:
There exist such a dense set of terms which characterize the
pension, investment and housing industries, that a basic
statement such as "pension funds should invest in housing",
once analyzed and delineated, would produce volumes of
definitions describing multiple interpretations.
Much of the public attention around pension funds has been
raised by public officials launching political agendas which
address local economic distress and point to the immense
capital resource accumulating in pension funds. This
attention projects the vast size of pension assets, and
beckons the investment of pension funds in local projects.
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What is often lacking is an explicit appeal which places into
proper perspective the role pension funds may take as a
capital resources.
Unlike banks and insurance companies, which have departments
that specifically target a portion of their assets to "social"
investments47 , pension funds are not required to develop a
specific division obliged to assess local community needs, and
target a given percentage of assets for local community
investment. Social benefit investment strategies are not
standard operations for pension funds nor are they expected to
be incorporated into a pension plans investment strategy.
One can appreciate the complexity behind the call for social
benefit investment. But it should be questioned whether it is
clear what social benefit investment means. Social benefit
investment is not simply a request to channel "pension funds"
to local development projects. Rather, it is a specific call
issued up a particular sector within the pension industry, ie.
public pensions. No longer is it simply "investment," but
rather, a social benefit investment strategy, which in turn,
'7 The development of a specific community investment
division within banks and insurance companies results from the
federal Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) of 1974, which has been
used to track local investments by these industries to residents
within local communities. To date, many communities have relied
on the CRA threat-- a threat which grants local communities
power to demand capital investments within those neighborhoods
which have been found to be under-serviced by these
institutions. See Community Reinvestment Act, 1974.
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refers to that portion of pension assets targeted to non-
traditional investment vehicles which result in a social good
while offering competitive returns. Housing, as the last
component of the social benefit investment proposal, has been
defined to a specific housing type, i.e. affordable housing,
further delineating the scope of this advocacy.
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Ideological Obstacles:
Since the late 1970's, pension funds have been investing
more of their assets in income-producing real estate and could
conceivably become one of the principal sources of capital for
that business. Yet the pension investor does not fully
understand the income property business, nor does the real
estate community understand how pension funds operate. Each
is only vaguely aware of the other's motivation.
The misunderstanding between the two businesses stems
largely from ignorance, but it also results from differing
ideological goals. Public pension funds operate for the
ultimate purpose of providing secure retirement income to the
beneficiaries of a plan. In contrast, investors in the real
estate market, such as housing, seek to capture maximum
returns on any given venture. Their attitudes toward risks
differ from pension managers who must seek safe investments
which do not jeopardize existing pension assets. Pension
managers are fiduciaries--trustees of their funds--and they
are bound by law to run them prudently and exclusively for the
benefit of the people in the plans. They can be sued for
imprudent investing by those in the plan, so they invest the
money at conservatively as possible.
An investor, on the other hand, sits on the opposite end of
the risk spectrum. He is not fiduciary. He invests for his
own account or that of his employer and he has one goal--to
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make money. He pays far less attention to the risks involved
since he runs no risk of being sued for imprudent investing
and can make a great deal of money if his investments do well.
More elementary, an investor can entertain a high risk project
with the expectation of compensation in assuming high risks by
obtaining high returns.
The separate approach towards investments has often reserved
public pension fund investment away from more high risk
investments. Social benefit investment, as viewed by the
pension industry, suggests investments in high risk ventures
such as affordable housing. As such, much skepticism arises
from the flow of these funds to such investments. Because
safe investments have been the pension industry tradition and
few examples exists which illustrate the merits of social
investments, pension managers tend to resist the
implementation of an investment strategy that potentially
threatens pension asset reserves.
In contrast to pension managers, public officials face
political pressure to address the funding of local development
projects. Because these officials do not manage pension funds
nor experience the legislative or industry constraints pension
managers face, their advocacy of using public pension funds in
social investments rests upon the identification of large
capital resource which could fund local development. Little
regard is given to the comprehension of the industry except to
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the extent of recognizing an investment proposal must be made
to pension managers in order to present an investment proposal
for consideration.
Similarly, local community agencies, development groups and
residents seek the use of pension funds with the belief that
these funds are "the answer" to the financing of affordable
housing, job creation, neighborhood revitalization, etc.
Little regard is given to the financial analysis of such
investments. Little attempt is made to understand the
dynamics of pension investment. Only recently, has literature
documented the need to develop sound and competitive proposals
under social benefit investment which may gain the approval of
investment managers.
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Practical Obstacles:
The move from theory to practice has often been
unsuccessful. This can be said of social benefit investment.
The structure of the pension system as it currently exists
places such stringent restrictions under which investments are
analyzed that the proposition of social benefit investments
conflicts with these restrictions and hence, fails to gain
support as an investment strategy. Theoretically, pension
funds could be invested in ventures that are viable and
produce a social good. Social benefit investment in this case
would offer the diversification of pension investments to
ventures that are sound and competitive, and may produce a
social good. However, diversification of pension assets is
not an excuse to accept below-market yields or accept high
risk projects for investment. In practice, the institutional
barriers which exist demand that pension investments be
competitive market-rate investments, thereby requiring a
market return for a given risk. In reality, many social
benefit investments have resulted in below-market yields, have
an estimated high risk without a commensurate returns, or an
estimated average risk with below-market returns. The few
examples the exist do not confirm that social benefit
investments offer competitive market yields nor high returns
nor necessarily safe investments. Looking at the primary
example of social benefit investment in housing--mortgage-
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backed securities--it has been documented that much
recognition is issued to such an investment for its relative
safeness but criticized for its lack or compromise in meeting
social benefits.
Taking the worse-case scenario, assume public pension funds
are invested in high risk social benefit investments which
offer only average returns. Assume that public pension funds
continue to investment 5% of their assets in such investment
projects. Assume that these investment prove to yield below-
market returns. Who is ultimately liable for the recapture of
these funds when paying out the guaranteed benefits to pension
plan members?
Ultimately, the state and local government will bear the
brunt of imprudent, un-sound investments. If pension fund
investments fail to generate investment earnings and
jeopardize the stock of pension assets, the state and local
governments which sponsor these plans must be accountable to
its' public employees and the guaranteed benefits promised to
them. As defined-benefit recipients, public pension members
need not worry about the investment performance of their
pension assets; the benefits the employees are guaranteed are
defined as a product of an established formula which defines
employee benefits. Investment earnings secure the actuarial
need of a system and the contributions of the participants.
However, these earnings bear little upon the amount of
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benefits received by a pension plan member.
What implications does social benefit investment have to
public pension members? Aside from the argument that direct
social benefits are earned, in financial terms, social benefit
investments offers greater risk to the stock of pension asset
than traditional pension investments. Where, then, does the
marriage between public pension funds and social benefit
investment such as housing emerge from? Chapter Four explores
whether social benefit investment as approached, is an
appropriate investment strategy for public pension funds.
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Summary:
The call for pension fund investment in housing raises
difficult issues and concerns that have not been resolved
since the initial debate began in 1976. The primary debate
regarding social benefit investment is the appropriateness of
a social benefit investment strategy within the constructs of
public pension standards. The presence of institutional,
practical and ideological obstacles has delayed the
implementation of a non-traditional public pension investment
strategy.
The call for social benefit investment of public pension
funds has assumed an association among distinct groups
interested in pension funds and their investments. This
assumption holds that a common goal exists among the various
groups. Such is not the case. If everyone involved endorsed
(and not everyone does) the diversification of pension
investment through a social benefit investment strategy, the
rea'lities of implementing such a proposal would still pose
difficult questions. One is the issue of unity, or consensus.
Not all interested parties have the same objective or goal in
mind for pension investments. Corporate management, union
leadership, pension trustees, local government and the
beneficiaries of the plan may all approach investment decision
and risk quite differently.
Each of the groups affected by a pension plan has a unique
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perspective, raising- another issue. Pension trustees charged
with fiduciary responsibilities must respond to different
pressures than members of the legislature. The same is true
for investment managers, who often are judged on fund
performance rather than on regional economic development or
the rate of innovation that strategically placed pension
investments might help address a local demand. Whichever
perspective, obstacles whether institutional, practical or
ideological continue to impede the implementation and usage of
a social benefit investment strategy.
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Chapter Four
Social Benefit Investment in Affordable Housing:
From Theory to Practice
The reader might wonder if given the unfavorable view of
social benefit investment presented in the previous chapter,
and the obstacles which exist that impair the implementation
of this strategy, is it even possible to introduce social
considerations into an investment program in light of the
considerable institutional and practical barriers to doing so.
One may question what is inappropriate about social benefit
investment. While there is no simple answer, often the direct
conflict between social goals and generally accepted levels of
prudence has deemed this strategy as inappropriate within the
constructs of public pension regulations. There is often a
trade-off in which the overall risk of the investment is
increased, with no commensurate increase (or decrease) in
yield; a form of market aversion occurs in which the investor
receives a lower return at higher risk.
Few instances exist to illustrate the implementation of this
strategy. A look at past attempts may give light to the
conditions in which social benefit investment can take place.
Experience over the last few years has demonstrated that a
small portion (less than three percent)48 of state and local
4 Kennedy, Gordon and Eugene B. Burroughs, "Adopting an
Institutional Real Estate Investment Policy" in Real Estate
Finance Journal, Summer 1985, page 52.
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pension assets has been used to fill local capital gaps
without sacrificing return or diversification objectives.
While the majority of social benefit investment has been
generated by the public sector, a number of private plans,
especially associated with unions, have been putting their
pension assets to new uses. [See Landecker, 1981, for a more
elaborate discussion on unions and strategic investments]
Most recently, the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD), recognizing union initiative to implementing social
benefit investment, has recommended that unions consider
investing their pension plans in projects that provide
affordable, moderate-income housing. At an April 12, 1988
investment workshop held in conjunction with an AFL-CIO
conference, HUD officials stressed that in addition to being
socially desirable, such investments can be designed to be
secure for pension participants. [Bureau of National Affairs,
19881
Other action taken upon by the unions has been the targeting
of pension funds specifically for social benefit investment.
The AFL-CIO has developed a $500 million program to use
pension funds for job creation in the construction industry.
In Southern California, 19 unions formed a consortium to
invest over $150 million drawn from their pension assets in 25
union construction projects within the state. Projects
included residential housing, condominiums and townhouse
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loans, office buildings, a hotel complex and a shopping
center. In Oregon, eight building and construction funds,
with approximately $300 million in assets, joined together to
form the Pacific Northwest Construction Finance Forum, which
aimed to invest in commercial and residential mortgages in the
Pacific Northwest. In Florida, the Palm Coast Affirmative
Investment Roundtable aimed to develop programs to use pension
funds in issuing market rate construction loans in union-
constructed commercial, residential and industrial real estate
projects.
In the public sector, much of the activity aimed at
implementing social benefit investment has been through the
development of state or local home loan programs. Hawaii
Public Employees Retirement System is the oldest example of
social benefit investment. Since 1959, it has made mortgage
loans to plan participants, lending money at favorable rates
to low-income borrowers and at market-rate to others; these
loans constitute 20% of the plan's assets. As of 1983, the
program accounted for $560 million of the pension's $1.8
billion investments. Roughly, 40 percent of the systems's
51,000 active and retired members have taken advantage of the
program.
Other states, such as California and New York, have take the
lead in implementing mortgage programs or intermediaries which
ease the investment of public pension funds in residential
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mortgages. The most popular form of investing in housing
among state-administered pension funds has been and continues
to be the purchase of mortgage-backed securities.
While it appears that housing investment would be welcomed
given the above examples, in actuality, the aggregate of
public pension funds has not been engaged in housing
investment.4 9 Thus far, public pension funds have basically
taken only two kinds of action in targeting their mortgage
investments--providing preferential interest rates on home
mortgage loans to public employees and targeting pension
investments in mortgage-backed securities [Munnell, 1983].
These two actions illustrate two contrary approaches in
implementing social benefit investments--neither of which have
gained full endorsement by all parties involved. On the one
hand, preferential interest rates on home mortgage loans often
solicits a sacrifice in yield, which conflicts with the
prudent man standards of the pension industry. On the other
hand, investment in mortgage-backed securities have taken
place within a sector of the financial market which has done
little to expand or lower the cost of capital resource for
housing finance [Munnell, 1983]. While safe and prudent
investments, as well as a vehicle for diversification,
mortgage-backed securities have failed to address the social
** See Rosen, Kenneth T., Affordable Housing, University
Press, Berkeley, 1986.
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need of affordable housing.
Few public pension funds could properly initiate and manage
social benefit investments without either first establishing
internal goals and objectives which aim to address local
social concerns, establishing the management capacity
internally to target these funds, or obtaining assistance from
external intermediaries which aid the transfer of pension
funds to these investments.
Social benefit investment requires extensive networking
among the players involved. A concerted effort between pension
managers, financial institutions, local government, and
housing advocates needs to take place if social benefit
investment as currently defined, is to be implemented.
Yet one must ask, under what climate would a public pension
manager collaborate with local government, financial
institutions and housing advocates to support social benefit
investments. The question follows, what would make social
bene'fit such a good deal? Would others invest in such
investments?
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Social Benefit Investment in Affordable Housing: A Model
An elementary model (as proposed by advocates of social
benefit investment) of public pension fund investment in
socially beneficial housing ventures would obviously have a
climate in which the necessary mechanisms--such as non-
restrictive regulatory legislature, pension investment
policies which incorporate a social benefit investment,
integrated financial programs with local financial
institutions, state and local financial intermediaries,
investment-literate housing advocates, and pension managers
who are real estate literate--existed in order to compliment
the call for social benefit investment. These mechanisms
would encourage the risk and return analysis while promoting
the social gains these investments offer. Concessionary
investments would not be endorsed since high risk ventures
would be offset by the amalgamation of these resources.
Under this scenario, social benefit investment of public
pension funds, is a suitable strategy in meeting
diversification objectives, has the potential to produce
market yields on investments (particularly if intermediaries
serve securitize an investment or insurance it through a local
guarantor) and if specifically targeted, may result in social
benefits for the general public. In one analysis, social
benefit investment in housing has been regarded as a prudent
balance for the highly volatile and disappointing performances
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of stocks and bonds [Schur, 19811.
Because public pension funds pay out benefits to its
membership in the future, they have a long-term investment
horizon. Unlike other investors, public pension funds can
tolerate investments that promise good long-term returns but
do not necessarily have substantial short-term cash flow. A
long-term horizon also suggests that pension funds can better
tolerate upswings and downswings in investment value (risk).
For social benefit investments, this aspect would suggest a
propensity in supporting long-term investments in housing.
While this model encourages the advancement of a social
benefit investment strategy, this model functions on
imperfections and non-existent market conditions. In reality,
no actual model exists. Social benefit investment, as
practiced, fails to encourage public pension funds investment
in less than traditional and/or financially sound investments;
fails to encourage investments which produce obvious social
benefits; and conventional wisdom suggests that it is not the
mechanism by which to solicit public pension fund investments-
-fifteen years of debate attest to its lack of implementation.
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Social Benefit Investment Strategy Under the Model Setting
In the last ten years public pension funds have financed
more projects which have been positive and alternative. The
increase in public knowledge of pension assets and the 15
years of debate have assisted in extending some knowledge of
public pension systems and their investment policies [Barber,
1988].
Given the regulations and constraints which dictates the
pension industry, why has discussion on social benefit
investment persisted? It appears that there is some
anticipated desire to channel the flow of pension funds into
vehicles that address local needs. In a decade of federal
cutbacks, the vast size of public pension funds makes them an
easy target for public attention. Public officials continue
to project there vast size to the public as a mountain of
wealth, which, through some measure can ultimately serve as a
panacea to the social ills many major cities now face.
One may ask what does it mean to promote an idea which
clearly does not transfer from theory to practice. Many
advocate of this strategy have suggested several methods which
they belief may facilitate social benefit investment. In their
view adopting a social benefit investment policy would require
an effort which comprehends the merits of this approach;
integration of several key concepts behind this approach needs
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to be adopted into: the investment objectives of the public
pension plans; state and local government policies; financial
investment programs; and must be understood by proponents of
affordable housing development. The following highlights the
techniques suggested by advocates which aim to advance the
practice of social benefit investment.
Criteria for Public Pension Funds:
To the purpose of facilitating a social benefit investment
strategy, investment objectives of a public pension plan
should directly confront the issues of risk tolerance, and
stipulate the flexibility allowed in assessing an investment
risk. The investment objectives should also directly address
the issue of safety and expected returns. Lastly, an
investment policy objective should include a statement of the
role in which non-financial factors, such as those resulting
from social benefit investing, play in the assessment of an
investment project and in the assessment of the benefits to
the overall portfolio.
Role of State and Local Government and Public Officials
The recent interest and activities of public pension funds
in social benefit investment raises several policy question
for the various levels of government in fostering public
policy goals in general and social benefit goals in specific.
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Federal, state and local governments have the ability to
encourage social benefit investments of public pension funds.
State governments have the ability to influence public
pension investment decision-making by regulating the
investment practices of state and local plans. With regard to
investments, state laws usually control the conduct of
fiduciaries by requiring them to invest pension funds in
accordance to the prudent man rule.
In most cases, public officials are not in a position to
implement social benefit investing directly. However,
indirectly, they can influence the decision-making process of
public pensions.
Public officials can ensure that pension investment laws
that currently exist do not containing rigid legal lists the
prevent prudent social benefit investments. These laws should
not remain outdated formulas but be revised with the basic
notion of reasonable care and responsibility to the retirement
plans' participants.
Public officials can also provide other forms of support for
effective social benefit investing to take place. These range
from research and analysis of the local demographics which
characterize a local municipality; identifying economic gaps
which have un-met local supply, (particularly affordable
housing); identifying and give priority to specific
investments and investment vehicles that pension fund trustees
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can consider. The latter requires a willingness to establish
the necessary public intermediaries or investment insurance
programs which will lessen the impact of adverse high risk
ventures.
Part of the task in implementing social benefit investment
rest in the creation of intermediaries which channel funds
where they are needed. These can either be quasi-governmental
operations or independent entities created to alter or
eliminate the conditions which impede pension participation in
non-traditional investment vehicles.
Types of intermediaries that government has created in
response to facilitate pension funds participation in the
capital markets has been the creation of institutions like the
Government National Mortgage Association and other debt
intermediaries financed by tax-exempt bonds, tax revenues or
investment guarantee.
Various financial programs have emerged which also serve the
role of intermediaries--mechanisms which assist the use of
pension funds. These programs bridge or pool pension funds
with other investment funds in particular investment vehicles.
Role of Financial Institutions:
The role of financial institutions in the advancement of a
social benefit investment policy of public pension fund rests
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in the support of non-traditional investments which are
identified and targeted by pension funds and public officials
as prudent investments. Support may come in the form of
originating residential mortgage loans for low-income housing
development, selling the mortgage-backed security to pension
funds, etc. Other support may include honoring the credit
enhancement a pension fund may extend to a socially beneficial
investment endeavor.
Since much of the advocacy centers on the direct use of
pension funds into an investment venture, the role of the
financial institution has been overshadowed, however it should
not be underestimated.
Role of Affordable Housing Advocates:
Fifteen years of advocacy and debate has done little for the
advancement of social benefit investment of pension funds in
housing development. This debate has stressed upon all
interested in pension investments, but more so, advocates of
housing, the importance of packaging sound and competitive
investments which may facilitate pension investment
consideration. Randy Barber, in an lecture addressing pension
funds and community investment, clearly articulates this
point: "You [community groups] represent a base of
infrastructure, knowledge and skill, and if you are willing to
plan for the long term--putting together technically sound and
98
competent proposals--you will be able to find [pension]
investors who are willing to listen to you." so
The soliciting of public pension funds in housing
development has been a strenuous battle which has resulted in
few instances of implementation. These instances however,
serve as models for other pension plans seeking precedent in a
field that has been viewed as highly speculative. Yet, if as
discussed, real estate is a solid, long-term investment with
stronger hedge to inflation that stocks and bonds, why do
pension managers continue to be so conservative in their
investment decision-making? Are they overly conservative,
especially when vehicles like mortgage-back securities have
proven to safe and prudent?
s0 op cit, Community Economics, Fall Issue 1988, page 2.
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Summary:
The current climate under which advocacy of social benefit
investment has take place is characterized as an atmosphere of
resistance. There are significant obstacles which have barred
the implementation of social benefit investment as an
investment policy and objective of public pension funds. Few
cases exist which illustrate the potential applications of
social benefit investment. These cases serve to counterpoint
the lack of social benefit investment instances.
Even with these few instances of social benefit investment,
it continues to be more a point of discussion than an actual
strategy for investment. This would suggest that even in
those environments where obstacles have been removed, or a
clear objective has been adopted and developed, institutional
barriers continue to hinder the widespread adoption of social
benefit investing as a policy for a portion of public pension
funds.
100
CONCLUSION
The debate on whether or not public pension funds should be
invested in socially useful ways persists to present day. Use
of such funds in the development of affordable housing is
being viewed by many public officials, public interest groups
and social activists as an un-tapped capital resource.
However, the realization of a social benefit investment
strategy for public pension funds has failed to gain usage due
to several factors.
The gap between the advocacy of social benefit investment
and its implementation is a product of stringent industry
standards, restrictive state and local legislature, poor
common knowledge of each interest group, and no common
terminology between each group. This gap has resulted in a 15
year old debate regarding the appropriateness of social
benefit investment.
In essence, the call for social benefit investment of public
pension funds creates a self-contained paradox. In theory,
public pension funds could be invested in viable, socially
beneficial investments. In practice, however, the
institutional barriers which exist demand that investments be
market-rate, competitive investments, thereby requiring
market-rate returns for a given risk. Conventional wisdom
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CONCLUSION
Public pension funds are being viewed by many public
officials, public interest groups and social activists as an un-
tapped capital resource. However, the realization of low-income
housing as an investment strategy for public pension funds has
failed to gain usage due to several factors.
The gap between the advocacy of public pension fund
investment in "affordable" housing and its implementation is a
product of several component: stringent industry standards,
restrictive state and local legislature, lack of communication
among the actors, and lack of common terminology between each
group. This gap has resulted in a 15 year old debate regarding
the appropriateness of social benefit investment.
In essence, the call for social benefit investment of public
pension funds in housing for low-income residents is a logically
contradictory appeal. Public pension funds can be invested in
viable, socially beneficial investments. But the institutional
barriers which exist demand that investments be market-rate to
insure that the beneficiaries of the funds, the retired public
employees get the maximum return on their invested funds.
Conventional wisdom shows that most current social benefit
investments have resulted in below-market yields and/or
involvement in high risk ventures without commensurate returns.
The few instances in housing investments have offered
competitive market-rate yields but have compromised the
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objective of producing a social benefit. The trade-off is
between prudent investment and investment in "affordable
housing."
Vehicles do exist which offer an investment choice in
housing to a pension manager. These investments conform to the
financial standards and investment performances that pension
investors seek in selecting ventures to finance. The mortgage-
backed securities unquestionably meets this application. If
"social investment" simply means investment in housing, then
mortgage-backed securities have been found to meet this goal.
On the other hand, if social benefit investment summons the
use of public pension funds in projects which do not satisfy the
established financial criteria and/or conflict with pension
standards, but satisfy the social good of financing low-income
housing, then pension managers must engage in un-precedented,
innovative investing which poses high investment risks for
average to below-market yields. Acceptance of below-market
yield directly jeopardizes the preservation of existing pension
assets, (and potentially, the defined-benefits retirees are
guaranteed) and defies "prudent man" standards (i.e. investments
which have not been proven to be safe, sound and prudent).
One must recognize that social benefit investment--meaning
low income housing rather than housing per se--fails to gain
usage within the regulated environment of the pension industry.
It is a proposal that is not appropriate within these
parameters. Ultimately, the responsibility of producing secure
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retirement income to pension plan members mandates that
investments of public pension funds be safe, sound and prudent.
Conformity to these measures demands that only competitive and
sound investments be financed.
The criteria of supporting technically sound and competitive
investments raises the point that public pension funds are not
an "alternative" capital resource that can in and of themselves
finance low-income housing. They represent a market-rate
capital resource, and pension managers as their investors demand
market-rate returns on their investments. Like banks and
capital investors, pension managers seek a maximum return on
investments. While public pension fund managers are
historically more conservative in the risks they are willingly
to assume than other investors, fundamentally, public pension
funds operate on the same standards as other capital investors.
If public pension funds cannot be other than market-rate
capital, then the proposition of many advocates including public
officials--that public pension funds be used to finance
affordable housing and neighborhood revitalization--suggests
that such investments will be at market-rate standards. If this
is the case, then why aren't other capital investors being
targeted? If market rate-of-return is not the case, then public
pension funds are not the appropriate resource. The gap between
the advocacy of social benefit investment of public pension
funds and the logic of such practice remains debatable.
104
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Bines, Harvey E., "Venture Capital" in Howard Pianko, ed.,
Legal Issues in Pension Investment, Practicing Law Institute.
New York, NY. 1981.
2. Community Economics No. 16, Institute for Community
Economics, Greenfield, MA. 1988.
3. Downs, Anthony, The Revolution in Real Estate Finance,
Brookings Institute. Washington, D.C., 1985.
4. Drucker, Peter, The Unseen Revolution: How Pension Fund
Socialism Came to America, Harper & Row, New York 1976.
5. Employee Benefit Research Institute, "Investment
Performance of Pension Funds." EBRI Issues Brief 40, 1985.
6. . "Pension Fund Management and
Financial Markets" EBRI Issues Brief 63, 1987.
7. . "Pension Investment and Financial
Markets" EBRI Issues Brief 80, 1988.
8. Florida, Richard L., ed., Housing and the New Financial
Markets, Center for Urban Policy Research: Rutgers University,
New Brunswick, New Jersey. 1986.
9. Kennedy, Gordon and Eugene B. Burroughs, "Adopting an
Institutional Real Estate Investment Policy" in Real Estate
Finance Journal, 1985.2.
10. [Koch, June Q., Dr.], Pension and Mortgages: Housing
Investment Opportunities for the 80's, U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development, Washington, D.C., 1983.
11. Landau, Richard S., Secondary Mortgage Markets, Montage
Institute Incorporated. Chicago: Probus Publishing Co., 1987.
12. Landecker, Anita E., "Strategic Investment of Pension
Fund." M.I.T. Master's Thesis, Department of Urban Studies and
Planning. 1982.
13. Litvak, Lawrence, Pension Funds and Economic Renewal,
Council of State Planning Agencies, Washington, D.C., 1981.
14. McMahon, John, "Developing A Real Estate Social Investment
Policy" in Real Estate Finance Journal, Summer 1985.
15. Munnel, Alicia H., Pensions for Public Employees, National
Planning Association Report #171. Washington, D.C. 1979.
105
BIBLIOGRAPHY
16. , "The Pitfalls of Social Investing:
The Case of Public Pensions and Housing." Federal Reserve Bank
(Boston, MA) 1983.
17. Pension and Investment Age,"Administration Pushes
Mortgages", March 15, 1982.
18. 
. "Public Pension Funds",
December 12, 1983.
19. Pension and Mortgages: Housing Investment Opportunities
for the 80's, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development, Washington, D.C., 1983.
20. Peterson, John E. and Catherine L. Spain, Alternative
Investing by State and Local Pension Funds: Concepts, Issues
and Policies. Government Finance Research Center, Washington
D.C. 1980.
21. Pickman, James and Benson F. Roberts, "Pension Funds
Investment: New Mechanisms and Techniques for Stimulating
Mortgage Participation." in Resources for Community-Based
Economic Development, Vol 2., No. 12, 1984.
22. Rifkin, Jeremy and Randy Barber, The North Will Rise
Again, Beacon Press, Boston. 1978.
23. Rosen, Kenneth T., Affordable Housing, University Press,
Berkeley, 1986.
24. 
. The Role of Pension Funds in Housing
Finance , Joint Center for Urban Studies at M.I.T. and
Harvard, 1976.
25. Ross, William B., "The Structure of Public Employee
Pension Funds." in Pension Funds and Residential Mortgages,
Mortgage Bankers Association of America. Washington, D.C.
1984.
26. Schur, Robert, The Housing Crisis: Strategv for Public
Pension Funds, Conference on Alternative State and Local
Policies, Washington, D.C. 1981.
27. Taylor, Suzanne Saunders, Public Employee Retirement
Systems, ILR Press: Cornell University, Ithaca, New York.
1986.
28. U.S. Congress, Employment Retirement Income Security Act,
29 U. S. C., 1002 (21). Washington, D.C. 1974.
106
REFERENCES
1. Bureau of National Affairs, "HUD Urges Union Pension Fund
Support of Moderate-Income Housing Projects." BNA Pension
Reporter 16, (April 1988).
2. Employee Benefit Research Institute, "How the Presidential
Candidates View Employee Benefit Issues." Employee Benefit
Notes 5, (May 1988a).
3. . EBRI Quarterly Pension
Investment Report, forth quarter 1987 (April 1988c).
4. Hemmerick, Steve, "Funds Bail Out Corporate U.S." Pension
and Investment Age, September 14, 1981.
5. Ippolito, Richard A. and John A. Turner, "Turnover, Fees
and Pension Plan Performances." Financial Analyst Journal 6
(November/December 1987).
6. Lea, Michael, Housing and the Capital Markets, M.I.T.
Center for Real Estate Development, Working Paper HP#8, April
1988.
7. McKelvy, Natalie A., Pension Fund Investment in Real
Estate,
Quorum Books: Westport, Conn., 1983.
8. McMahon, John, "Institutional Strategies for Real Estate
Equity Investment", Urban Land, June 1981.
9. Pension Funds and Residential Mortage Investments,
Mortgage Bankers Association of America, Washington, D.C.
1982.
10. "Real Estate Investing by Pension Funds", Pension World,
September 1981.
11. Wong, Beckie Wai Yee, Equity Real Estate as a Pension Fund
Investment, M.I.T. Master's Thesis, 1978.
12. Zorn, Paul, Public Pension Funds for Economic Development,
Office of Planning, Technical Assistance, Research and
Evaluation, Economic Development Administration, U.S.
Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C. 1984.
107
